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SETTIMENT

Settlement: Release reserving rights against car owner construed as
covenant not to sue driver.
When a party releases one joint tort-feasor26 9 or a co-obligor 270 but
reserves his rights against other tort-feasors or co-obligors, the agreement is construed as a covenant not to sue and not a general release.
Whether a release of an automobile driver which reserves all rights
against the owner of the car should be construed similarly as a
27 1
covenant not to sue was the issue in Plath v. Justus.
In Plath, plaintiff instituted a wrongful death action under section
388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, against an automobile owner.
Plaintiff had released the driver expressly but reserved all rights
against all other persons. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
upon the basis of said release. The Supreme Court, Rensselaer County,
denied the motion, upon the ground that the alleged release was in
fact a covenant not to sue which was not intended by the parties to
release the defendant. Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division,
Third Department, affirmed. 272 Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed, upon the ground that such instruments should be construed
in accordance with the intention of the parties. 273 The court believed
that an injured party should be permitted to settle a portion of his
claim with one of the wrongdoers while expressly reserving his rights
against other wrongdoers.27 4 Possible double recovery was not deemed a
problem, for the amount of a settlement can be deducted from the
later recovery.2 75 There was no discussion of a possible third party
action, in which the owner would recover over against the driver.
Intention of the parties should be decisive in interpreting an
agreement. Hence, the Plath decision is just, for it is consistent with
the intention of the parties. As Dean Prosser stated,
[a] plaintiff should never be compelled to surrender his cause of
action against any wrongdoer unless he has intentionally done so,
269 Lucia v. Curran, 2 N.Y.2d 157, 139 N.E2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1956).
270 N.Y. GEN. OBUGATIONS LAW §§ 15-101 to 15-109 (1964).
27128 N.Y.2d 16, 268 N.E.2d 117, 319 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1971), aff'g 33 App. Div. 2d 833, 306
N.Y.S.2d 80 (3d Dep't 1969).
272 33 App. Div. 2d at 834, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 81, citing Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d
100, 187 N.E.2d 556, 236 N.YS.2d 953 (1962).
273 28 N.Y.2d at 22, 268 N.E.2d 120, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 437; accord, Boucher v. Thomsen,
328 Mich. 312, 43 N.W.2d 866 (1950).
274 Id. at 23, 268 N.E.2d at 120, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
275 Id.
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or unless he has received such full compensation that he is no
longer entitled to maintain it.276

When an aggrieved party expressly reserves his rights against other
parties while releasing still others, it is clear that he neither intends
to relinquish his claims against them nor considers himself fully compensated. Such an agreement is properly interpreted as a covenant not
to sue, not a general release.
276 IV. PRossm, Tom-s § 46, at 272 (3d ed. 1964). See 2 S. WU=LsON, ComRArs

at 722-23 (3d ed. 1957).
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